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THE PRETRIAL DETENTION "CRISIS": THE
CAUSES AND THE CURE
INTRODUCTION
Amidst the exposure surrounding the double murder trial of O.J.
Simpson, the controversial use of pretrial detention was again
brought to the forefront.' O.J. Simpson spent three months in prison
before trial2 although he was not convicted on either murder charge.
The lengthy pretrial detainment of O.J. Simpson and his subsequent
not guilty verdict gives rise to the question: does pretrial detention
best serve justice? Indeed, some may argue that the detainment of
O.J. Simpson during his double murder trial provides a strong
impetus for re-evaluating the current status of the pretrial detention
system.
1. Although the focus of this Note is on the federal pretrial detention statute, the
indistinguishable effects of state and federal pretrial detention makes such an analogy
appropriate.
2. Police took O.J. Simpson into custody on June 17, 1994. See Art Berman & John J.
Goldman, Nation Transfixed by Extraordinary Spectacle Chase: Millions are Riveted to Their
TVs by Bizarre Pursuit of Simpson, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1994, at A-1. His trial began three
months later in September of 1994.
Although three months seems like a long time to spend in jail before trial, "[t]he Bail
Reform Act itself contains no time limits on the period of detention." United States v.
Melendez-Carnon, 790 F.2d 984, 996 (2d Cir. 1986). In fact, at least one circuit has ruled that a
sixteen month pretrial detainment period was not excessive. See Bruce D. Pringle, Bail and
Detention in Federal Criminal Proceedings, 22 COLO. LAW, 913, 914 (1993) (citing United
States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986).
In addition to the three months O.J. Simpson spent in prison before the trial, he was also
incarcerated throughout the duration of the trial. In total, O.J. Simpson spent 15 months in
prison, yet was ultimately acquitted of both murder charges. California v. Simpson, No.
BA07921 1, 1995 WL 704381, at *2-3 (Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 3, 1995).
3. See Simpson, 1995 WL 704381, at *2-3.
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Section 3142 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (BRA or the Act)4
authorizes a judge to detain a federal criminal defendant pending
trial. This section allows a judge to detain a defendant if the judge
determines that conditions exist that raise doubt as to whether the
defendant will appear at trial or whether the defendant may cause
harm to the community.5 But the pretrial detention system has been
plagued with deficiencies since its inception.6 Pretrial detention has a
negative impact on a jury's verdict,7 on a pretrial detainee's access to
legal representation, and on the operation of the federal court
system.9 Accordingly, experts contend that the pretrial detention
system is trapped in a state of "crisis.' 0
In fact, the BRA was met with an onslaught of legal scrutiny and
proposed solutions even before the system was implemented." Yet
these proposed solutions failed to take into account all the
deficiencies of the Act. Therefore, even if these proposed solutions
are implemented, they would not solve the "crisis." Because the
shortcomings of the pretrial detention exist at several levels of the
criminal justice system, the effective amelioration of the pretrial
detention system hinges upon change at several levels of the criminal
justice system.
This Note recommends that scholars and legislators adopt a wide
perspective when formulating a solution to the pretrial detention
"crisis." Part I traces the history of section 3142 and provides a
working definition of the statute. Part II discusses some of the
shortcomings of the Act and the causes of the "crisis." Part III
demonstrates the urgent need for a solution by describing the
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1994). This section is appropriately entitled: "Release or detention
of a defendant pending trial." Id.
5. See § 3142(e).
6. For a discusssion of the problems and concerns that arose from the implementation of
the pretrial detention system, see infra Part I.
7. See infra Part Il.A.
8. See infra Part Il.C.
9. See infra Part M.D.
10. See Daniel B. Ryan, The Federal Detention Crisis: Causes and Effects, FED.
PROBATION, Mar. 1993, at 54.
11. See infra Part IV.
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negative effect of pretrial detention on defendants, the prison system,
defense attorneys, and the federal court system. Part IV outlines a few
of the proposed solutions and highlights the strengths and weaknesses
of each proposal. In conclusion, Part V makes recommendations to
marshals, probation officers, prosecutors, public defenders, and
judges on how to effectively modify the pretrial detention system.
1. HISTORY OF SECTION 3142 OF THE BAIL REFORM ACT
Congress enacted section 3142 of the BRA in response to the
inadequacy of its predecessor, the 1966 Bail Reform Act (1966
Act). 2 The impetus for the revision was the inability of the 1966 Act
to protect society from crimes committed by accused criminals while
out on bail. 3 The 1966 Act's primary goal was to guarantee a
defendant's presence at trial. 4 In contrast, the purpose of the 1984
BRA was to prevent defendants from commiting crimes while
released on probation. 5
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976
(1984).
13. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3182, 3185
("Federal bail laws must address the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on
release and must give the courts adequate authority to make release decisions that give
appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released.").
14. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 ("The adoption of these changes marks a significant
departure from the basic philosphy [sic] of the Bail Reform Act [of 1966], which is that the sole
purpose of bail laws must be to assure the appearance of the defendant at judicial
proceedings."). For criticism of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, see H.R. REP. No. 91-907, at 87-
104 (1970).
Before 1966, federal courts almost exclusively used monetary bonds to assure a
defendant's presence at trial. The 1966 Act instituted nonmonetary conditions designed to
assure a defendant's appearance in court. See Pringle, supra note 2, at 913.
15. For example, the 1984 BRA creates a rebuttable presumption favoring detention if the
defendant has been previously convicted of certain offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Section
3142(e) reads in pertinent part:
In a case described in subsection (f)(1) of this section [detention sought on motion by
the Government], a rebuttable presumption arises that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community if
the [judge] finds that-
(1) the person has been convicted of a Federal offense that is described in subsection
(f)(1) of this section, or of a State or local offense that would have been an offense
described in subsection (f)(1) of this section if a circumstance giving rise to Federal
19971
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Section 3142 of the BRA authorizes either the prosecuting
attorney or the judge to initiate a pretrial detention hearing via a
motion.'6 However, there are limits to when pretrial detention can be
sought.' Section 3142(f)(1) of the BRA permits the prosecuting
attorney to initiate a pretrial detention hearing if the case involves a
crime of violence, an offense for which the maximum sentence is life
imprisonment or death, or an offense for which a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled
Substances Act.'"
Section 3142(f)(2)(B) of the BRA loosens the restrictive nature of
section 3142(0(1) by granting authority to the prosecuting attorney or
jurisdiction had existed;
(2) the offense described in paragraph (1) of this subsection was committed while
the person was on release pending trial for a Federal, State, or local offense; and
(3) a period of not more than five years has elapsed since the date of conviction, or
the release of the person from imprisonment, for the offense described in paragraph (1)
of this subsection, whichever is later.
Id.
16. See§3142(f).
17. See id. These limitations, in theory, prevent a prosecutor from seeking detention on a
whim. The limitations dictate that:
The judicial officer shall hold a [detention] hearing...
(1) upon motion of the attorney for the Government, in a case that involves-
(A) a crime of violence;
(B) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death;
(C) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.); or
(D) any felony if such person has been convicted of two or more offenses described
in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of this paragraph, or two or more State or local
offenses that would have been offenses described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of
this paragraph if a circumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed, or a
combination of such offenses; or
(2) upon motion of the attorney for the Government or upon the judicial officer's own
motion in a case, that involves-
(A) a serious risk that such person will flee; or
(B) a serious risk that such person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or
threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a
prospective witness or juror.
18. See id.
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judge to request a detention hearing if the defendant poses "a serious
risk" to flee, obstruct justice, or intimidate a witness." However,
Congress' use of the "serious risk" language requires judicial
interpretation. The inclusion of such a manipulable provision reflects
congressional intent to rely on judicial discretion when making a
detention determination.2"
After a motion for pretrial detention has been filed, the court
immediately conducts a detention hearing." At the detention hearing,
the defendant is afforded an opportunity to testify, present witnesses
on his own behalf, and introduce evidence by proffer.22 To sustain a
motion for pretrial detention, the prosecution must show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the defendant presents either a risk of flight
from the jurisdiction or a risk to the safety of any other person or the
community."
Section 3142 of the BRA does offer alternatives to detention.24
For example, a defendant may be released on his own recognizance
25
or nominated for conditional release. 6 The existence of alternatives
19. § 3142(f)(2)(B).
20. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 5 ("[I]t is intolerable that the law denies judges the tools to
make honest and appropriate decisions regarding the release of such defendants.").
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Section 3142(0 provides:
The [detention] hearing shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance
before the [judge] unless that person, or the attorney for the Government, seeks a
continuance. Except for good cause, a continuance on motion of such person may not
exceed five days, and a continuance on motion of the attorney for the Government may
not exceed three days.
d.
22. See id
23. See § 3142(f).
24. See § 3142(a). The pertinent part of subsection (a) lists as alternatives to detention:
(1) release[] on [defendant's] personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured
appearance bond... ;
(2) release[] on a condition or combination of conditions...;
(3) temporarfy] detain[ment] to permit revocation of conditional release, deportation,
or exclusion ....
25, See § 3142(a)(1).
26. See § 3142(c). Such conditions include the release of the defendant:
1997]
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illustrates the impact that judges and other officers of the court27 have
at a detention hearing. 28 Indeed, the catch-all provision of section
(A) subject to the condition that the person not commit a Federal, State, or local
crime during the period of release; and
(B) subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions,
that [he] determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required
and the safety of any other person and the community, which may include the
condition that the person-
(i) remain in the custody of a designated person, who agrees to assume
supervision and to report any violation of a release condition to the court, if the
designated person is able reasonably to assure the judicial officer that the person
will appear as required and will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person
or the community;
(ii) maintain employment, or, if unemployed, actively seek employment;
(iii) maintain or commence an educational program;
(iv) abide by specified restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or
travel;
(v) avoid all contact with an alleged victim of the crime and with a potential
witness who may testify conceming the offense;
(vi) report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency, pretrial
services agency, or other agency;
(vii) comply with a specified curfew;
(viii) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous
weapon;
(ix) refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of narcotic drug or other
controlled substance... without a prescription by a licensed medical practitioner,
(x) undergo available medical, psychological or psychiatric treatment,
including treatment for drug or alcohol dependency, and remain in a specified
institution if required for that purpose;
(xi) execute an agreement to forfeit upon failing to appear as required,
property of a sufficient unencumbered value, including money, as is reasonably
necessary to assure the appearance of the person as required, and shall provide the
court with proof of ownership and the value of the property along with
information regarding existing encumbrances as the judicial office may require;
(xii) execute a bail bond with solvent sureties ... in such amount as is
reasonably necessary to assure appearance of the person as required... ;
(xiii) return to custody for specified hours following release for employment,
schooling, or other limited purposes; and
(xiv) satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the
appearance of the person as required and to assure the safety of any other person
and the community.
Id. Note that this list of alternatives to detention is not exhaustive.
27. The term "officers of the court" encompasses judges, marshals, prosecutors, probation
officers, public defenders, and pretrial services officers.
28. See infra Part V.
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3142(c) 29 illustrates Congress' desire to give the judge discretion at a
detention hearing.3" Although indicative of congressional intent, the
manipulable nature of the statute leaves ample room for abuse3' and
has been the subject of much criticism.
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS
The pretrial detention system has been met with criticism since its
inception. The criticism stems from a combination of the negative
effect of detention with the inability of the pretrial detention system
to consistently detain only those defendants who pose a risk to
society if released. The ineffectiveness of the pretrial detention
system is traceable to several factors: the failure of pretrial services,
the unavailability of probation alternatives, coercive actions by
prosecutors, and the difficulty in predicting dangerousness inherent in
section 3142. Because several factors contribute to the "crisis," a
solution should not be limited to one aspect of the statute or a single
officer of the court.
A. The Failure of Pretrial Services
Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (STA)12
establishing pretrial services programs in ten representative judicial
districts to determine if pretrial services warranted nationwide
implementation." Congress created these ten demonstration agencies
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (cX2Xxiv).
30. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
31.
The [judge] is not given unbridled discretion in making the detention determination.
Congress has specified the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors
include the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the
Government's evidence against the arrestee, the arrestee's background and
characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect's
release.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (citation omitted).
32. Pub. L. No. 93-619, §§ 3152-3156, §§ 3161-2174, 88 Stat. 2076, 2088 (1975),
amended by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3155 (Supp. Ill 1985).
33. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3155 (1976) (amended 1982).
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to meet two goals: (1) to reduce the likelihood that defendants
released before trial will commit a crime and (2) to reduce the
number of released defendants who flee the jurisdiction. 4 Due to the
success of the ten test programs,35 Congress enacted the Pretrial
Services Act (PSA) in 1982.36
The PSA mandated the creation of pretrial services programs in
every federal jurisdiction. 7 Although the value of a well developed
pretrial services program is evident,38 some federal districts fail to
provide adequate services.39 This limitation tends to inhibit a judge
from making an accurate detention determination.
While the PSA mandated the establishment of pretrial services
programs in every federal judicial district,4" the quality and funding
of the program varies from district to district.4' In accordance with
section 3152(a) of the PSA, some federal districts established a
separate pretrial services office.4 2 In contrast, other districts
developed a pretrial services office as an extension of pre-existing
probation offices.4 3 This inconsistency becomes significant when one
considers the impact of pretrial services on a pretrial detention
34. Seeinfranote35.
35. See Betsy K. Wanger, Note, Limiting Preventive Detention Through Conditional
Release: The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320, 326-29
(1987) (discussing how the success of demonstration agencies, implemented pursuant to the
Speedy Trial Act, led to the enactment of the Pretrial Services Act of 1982).
36. Pub. L. No. 97-267, § 2, 96 Stat. 1136 (1982).
37. See § 3152(a). The Act also provides that once established, such services should be
supervised by a chief probation or pretrial services officer. See id.
38. See Wanger, supra note 35, at 327 n.47. See generally S. REP. No. 97-77, at 2-3
(1981) (discussing the origins of the Pretrial Services Act).
39. See Wanger, supra note 35, at 330-35 (discussing how "the congressional mandate of
nationwide implementation of the 1982 Act has not been fulfilled"). Of 93 federal districts, only
7 contacted more than 90% of defendants before detention hearings; 54 contacted fewer than
50%; 26 contacted fewer than 25% of defendants; and 7 districts reported delivery of no pretrial
services at all. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS' IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1982 PRETRIAL SERVICES ACT, app. II at 19-21 (1985),
cited in Wanger, supra note 35, at 33 1.
40. See Wanger, supra note 35, at 329.
41. See id. at 330-35.
42. See id. at 333-34.
43. See id. at 333.
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hearing.' Because a judge relies on pretrial services offices in order
to make an informed detention determination, an underdeveloped
pretrial services office undermines the effectiveness of pretrial
detention.
B. Unavailability of Probation Alternatives
The unavailability of probation alternatives also negatively affects
the use of pretrial detention. The lack of alternatives to detention,
such as home electronic monitoring and halfway houses, limits what
alternatives to detention a judge can arrange. Either an increase in
spending or a reallocation of funding would present a judge with
more alternatives to detention. 5 Such increases in spending would
likely be cost-effective.' If federal districts are unable to afford
various probationary tools, a judge is less likely to release a
defendant into a probationary program. Such a limitation contradicts
congressional intent, which envisioned a pretrial detention system
which would rely on a judge's ability to make a risk determination
and act accordingly."
The federal court system recommends a variety of probationary
alternatives.4" These recommendations include alternatives to
44. Pretrial services functions include the following:
[c]ollect[ing], verifying], and reportfing] to the judicial officer, prior to the pretrial
release hearing, information pertaining to the pretrial release of each individual
charged with an offense, including information relating to any danger that the release
of such person may pose to any other person or the community, and, where
appropriate, include a recommendation as to whether such individual should be
released or detained and, if release is recommended, recommend appropriate
conditions of release ...
18 US.C. § 3154(1).
The agency is also responsible for ensuring that a released defendant observes the terms of
his or her release. See § 3154(3). In light of these responsibilities, an independent, fully funded
pretrial services office would be ideal. See Wanger, supra note 35, at 322.
45. See Interview with Dan Cronin, Public Defender, Southern District of Illinois, in East
St. Louis, Il1. (Nov. 14, 1995). Some districts have access to certain probationary tools, but
simply can not afford them. See id.
46. See id.
47. See S. REP. No. 98-225, supra note 20.
48. In November of 1991, the administrative offices of the United States Courts forwarded
1997]
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detention49 and conditions of release.5" Although the alternatives to
detention include home confinement with electronic monitoring and
halfway houses,' this option may be idealistic at best. Electronic
monitoring devices are cost effective when compared to detention, 2
but they are not available in every district. 3 Likewise, halfway
houses may not be available or may be too far away from the pretrial
services officer or courthouse to rationalize its use.54
C. Coercive Actions by Prosecutors
Prosecutorial discretion also adds to the ineffectiveness of pretrial
detention. Prosecutors have the authority to pursue a plea agreement
and bargain with a defendant. 55 Because a prosecutor can decide
whether or not to pursue pretrial detention,56 they can use pretrial
a reference on alternatives to detention to judicial officers in the federal court system. See
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL OFFICERS REFERENCE ON
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION (1991).
49. See id. at 1-19. The list of alternatives include: reporting to a designated agency; third-
party custody; outpatient substance abuse treatment; outpatient mental health treatment; curfew;
financial conditions; bail bond with solvent surety; residential substance abuse treatment;
residential mental health treatment; home confinement without electronic monitoring systems;
home confinement with electronic monitoring systems; halfway houses; and return to custody.
See id.
50. See id. at 20-26. The list of conditions of release include: employment; education;
restricted association, place of abode, or travel; no victim/witness contact; no weapons; no
excessive use of alcohol/illegal drugs; and a catch-all category to cover any other condition that
is "reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the defendant as required and to assure the
safety of any other person and the community." Id. at 26. Examples given of such conditions
include: surrender of a passport, professional license or certificate, or driver's license. See id.
51. See also infra note 54.
52. See Interview with Dan Cronin, supra note 45.
53. See id.
54. See id. The use of halfway houses as an alternative to detention is inhibited by United
States Marshall's Office (USMO) guidelines. See id. The USMO is responsible for producing a
detained defendant for federal criminal proceedings. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 55. USMO
guidelines require that a defendant be detained within a reasonable commuting distance of the
federal courts. See id. The Department of Justice determined that a reasonable distance to
commute is a one-way 30 minute drive. See id. Consequently, if halfway houses are further than
30 minutes away from the court house, such an alternative becomes unavailable to a judge,
55. See interview with Dan Cronin, supra note 45.
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
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detention as a bargaining chip during plea negotiations. 7 This
converts pretrial detention from a method of protecting society from
crimes committed by criminals out on bail into a tool which helps
prosecutors obtain information or convictions. As a result, those
criminals who are the target of section 3142 may be released on
probation because they expose other criminals, while less dangerous
defendants may be detained.5" This phenomenon clearly contradicts
the purpose of the statute.
D. Difficulty in Predicting Dangerousness
An important facet of pretrial detention is a judge's ability to
predict which criminals are most likely to commit crimes if released
on probation.59 Defendants have attacked the BRA on grounds that
the test for determining "dangerousness" is unconstitutionally
vague.' Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality
57. See Michael Harwin, Note, Detainingfor Danger Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984:
Paradoxes of Procedure and Proof, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (1993) (noting that although
completely legal and normative, "it is widely acknowledged that the government now
commonly misuses the leverage of pretrial detention to extract premature guilty pleas and
cooperation agreements in exchange for pretrial release"). See also Marc Miller & Martin
Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 339 n.33 (1990)
("The power of plea bargaining in the pretrial process where the defendant is detained is
extraordinary; only 1% to 10% of all defendants ever make it to the trial stage. A first offender
detainee is more likely to be convicted and severely sentenced than a recidivist with more than
ten prior arrests who was released before trial.") (citation omitted).
58. See Harwin, supra note 57, at 1095.
59. See supra note 13. The primary objective of a court during a detention hearing is to
determine whether a defendant is dangerous, that is, whether a defendant would threaten the
"safety of any other person or the community" if released on bail. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 12.
60. For example, in United States v. Payden, the defendant argued that the BRA was
unconstitutionally vague because it gave inadequate notice of the conduct that would lead to
pretrial detention. United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp. 1388, 1396 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 759 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1985). The court rejected this argument, reasoning that §
3142(g), which lists those factors to be considered when making a detention determination,
effectively limits the discretion of ajudge. See id. at 1397.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) reads:
The [judgel shall, in determining whether there are conditions of release that will
reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the community, take into
account the available information concerning-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the
19971
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of the BRA,6 the absence of a statutory definition of dangerousness
makes detention hearings susceptible to discretionary inaccuracy.62
Such inaccuracy prevents the criminal justice system from making an
accurate detention determination in every case.
Although courts narrowly construe the limitations the BRA places
on a judge's discretion at a detention hearing, empirical studies
offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including-
(A) his character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment,
financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past
conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record
concerning appearance at court proceedings; and
(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on
probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or
completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that
would be posed by the person's release.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
The Payden court stated that:
The "void for vagueness" doctrine is usually applied to situations where a statute
does not give notice of the type of behavior that is prohibited. The new bail statute
does not prohibit conduct, rather it establishes a framework for a judge to detain an
individual based on a predication of possible future conduct. A vagueness claim is
therefore not appropriate for this statute.
Payden, 598 F. Supp. at 1396. See also United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of the
District of Columbia pretrial detention statute); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)
("Our cases indicate ... that from a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable
about a prediction of future criminal conduct."); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 9 ("[The committee
believes that judges can, by considering factors such as those noted above, make such
predictions with an acceptable level of accuracy.").
61. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
62. See Jack F. Williams, Process and Detention: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial
Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 335-345 (1994). Empirical studies generally conclude that
pretrial predictions of dangerousness are inaccurate. These studies show that a large number of
nondangerous defendants are nevertheless detained as dangerous. "[S]tudies on predicting
dangerousness have shown that experts are accurate at predictions of future dangerousness
about one-third of the time and that experts overpredict dangerousness, yielding a false positive
rate of sixty percent." Id. at 343-44. See also THOMAS BAK, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, DEFENDANTS WHO AVOID DETENTION-A GOOD RISK? (1994) (discussing
statistics that show that "most defendants whom the government feared would commit an act of
violence did not do so").
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conclude that pretrial predictions of dangerousness are often
inaccurate.63 The inaccuracy of predictions of dangerousness means
that a defendant who Congress desires to be detained may be released
on bail while non-dangerous defendants may suffer the consequences
of being detained.
III. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION
The shortcomings of the pretrial detention system negatively
affect pretrial detainees, the prison system, defense attorneys, and the
courts.' Therefore, in order to be successful, a solution must take
into account each of these aspects of the criminal justice system.
A. Effect on the Pretrial Detainee
The legislative history of the BRA reveals congressional concern
for the protection of society, not the troubles of the defendant.6" At
the time the defendant is detained before trial, however, he has not
been found guilty. Therefore, he is entitled to the same constitutional
safeguards which apply to other individuals.' Yet, a pretrial detainee
is exposed to the same conditions as convicted criminals, even
though the pretrial detainee may be ultimately acquitted.
The most glaring concern of the pretrial detainee is the large
percentage of detainees who are eventually found guilty.67 This fact
may indicate that judges are correctly predicting which defendants
pose a grave enough danger to the community to warrant detaining
them before trial. Such an interpretation is logical because section
3142(g)(2) of the BRA instructs judges to consider the weight of the
63. See Williams, supra note 62.
64. This list of negative effects should not be viewed as exclusive.
65. Seesupra note 13.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person
shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... ").
67. For example, in 1987 and 1988, approximately 85% of pretrial detainees were
eventually convicted of a criminal offense. See Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the
Bail Reform Act of 1984: An Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 15 (1989).
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evidence against the defendant when making a detention
determination.68 On the other hand, the tendency of pretrial detainees
ultimately to be found guilty may reflect juror bias. Jurors may
reason that if the defendant was incarcerated, then he must be guilty
of the charged offense because the government would not have jailed
the defendant in the first place.69
The logistics of pretrial detention pose additional problems for the
pretrial detainee.7" Because of overcrowding, prisoners, including
pretrial detainees, may be incarcerated in facilities far away from the
district in which they are tried.7' This distance can inhibit a defense
attorney from consulting with the pretrial detainee. Further, a cross-
country bus ride the day before trial may leave a defendant looking
tattered and worn out.72 Such a presence in the courtroom may
reinforce a jury's inclination to convict a pretrial detainee. On the
other hand, if the pretrial detainee appears relaxed and comfortable, a
jury may infer that the defendant is not guilty.7'
Eventually, the negative effects of pretrial detention spurred
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2).
69. Although judges will remove a jury to prevent it from seeing a defendant enter the
courtroom in shackles, prison garb is an unmistakeable indication that an individual is in the
custody of the USMO.
70. See Vincent L. Broderick, Pretrial Detention in the Criminal Justice Process, FED
PROBATION, Mar. 1993, at 5-6 (discussing the difficulties defense attorneys have in
communicating with their clients because, if detained, the clients are housed far away and
moved often).
71. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 55 (citing Letter of Leonard F. Joy to Honorable James L,
Oakes, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (Nov. 20, 1991)). Mr. Joy recounts
a situation where a defendant awaiting trial was moved from a detention facility in New York to
a facility in Texas due to prison overcrowding. See id.
72. See id. In his letter to Judge Oakes, Mr. Joy explained:
Many of our clients are being bounced around like ping pong balls between
institutions. They are awakened in the middle of the night in preparation for a trip to
court and when they arrive they are exhausted and have difficulty concentrating. More
than one District Judge has commented on the sorry, exhausted condition some of the
incarcerated defendants are in. The clients who have not yet had detention hearings
often are kept for days with little or no hygiene and inadequate sleep and food.
Id.
73. This does not imply that innocent defendants are found guilty solely because of their
tattered appearance. It reflects the limited information that the jury has to determine guilt. Thus,
it is likely that a juror would consider a defendant's appearance when determining guilt.
(Vol. 52:281
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lawsuits.74 Opponents of pretrial detention claimed the BRA violated
an individual's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
75
In United States v. Salerno,76 however, the Supreme Court rejected
the Eighth Amendment argument and upheld the constitutionality of
the BRA.
77
B. Effect on the Prison System
Another side-effect of pretrial detention is the impact on the
prison population. In some prisons, the occupancy far exceeds the
maximum number of inmates the facility was intended to
accommodate.7" As a result, prison overcrowding leads to lighter
sentences and the early release of convicted criminals. 79 Although
prison overcrowding is a result of years of neglect and a combination
of other factors,"° the increase in the number of pretrial detainees
enhances the problem. Moreover, the effect of pretrial detention on
prison overcrowding appears unjustifiable when considering that
74. Defendants in such cases claimed pretrial detention violated their constitutional rights.
See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,
261 (1984). The detainment of a defendant who is not guilty is another negative effect of the
pretrial detention system, however, it is not treated as a separate category in this Note because it
is encompassed in other negative effects discussed.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
76. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
77. See id. at 748 ("We have repeatedly held that the Government's regulatory interest in
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty
interesL"). The opinion also states that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate and
compelling regulatory goal which Congress has the power to initiate. See id. at 750.
78. See Jeff Potts, American Penal Institutions and Two Alternative Proposals for
Punishment, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 443, 447-48 (1993). See also Leonore H. Tavill, Note, Scarlet
Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty Is Today's Probation Condition, 36 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 613, 615 n.20 (1988) (providing specific statistics on prison overcrowding).
79. See Judith A. Johnson, Our Exploding Jails, 22 JUDGEs' J., Winter 1983, at 4 ("The
incarceration rate is more closely related to the amount of space available than to any other
factor."). See also Tavill, supra note 78, at 615 ("Now maybe the time to become a criminal.
The likelihood of being sentenced to prison or jail is decreasing daily [because of the prison
overcrowding crisis].").
80. See Potts, supra note 78, at 447-50. The author discusses various factors that account
for the prison overcrowding problem including "a wholesale incarceration attitude, tougher
sentencing procedures, increased drug enforcement, decreased economic conditions, increased
prison space as new prisons are built, and demographic shifts." Id. at 448.
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many of the recommended pretrial detention alternatives cost
substantially less than the $21,900 a year it costs to incarcerate a
single inmate.8
C. Effect on Defense Attorneys
Like their clients, pretrial detention affects criminal defense
attorneys. Specifically, defense attorneys encounter difficulty when
attempting to build a case for their clients.82 Although the negative
impact of pretrial detention is not as severe for defense attorneys as
pretrial detainees, the stigma of losing a case or professional
repercussions for inadequate representation present a legitimate threat
to an attorney's practice.83
Incarceration of a client affects a defense attorney's ability to
build a case in several ways. First, an attorney's access to a client
may be hindered if the client is jailed in a remote facility." Second, if
a client is moved from one facility to another,8" a defense attorney
may face difficulties locating the client.8 6 Finally, even if a defense
attorney has access to a client, the inability to meet confidentially
81. See Potts, supra note 78, at 452-455 (citing Jim Bencivenga, Serving Time in a
Computer 'Cell', CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 17, 1991, at 12). But see Anna Quindlen, A
Corrections System that Doesn't Correct, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1992, at 17 (estimating operating
costs between $25,000 and $40,000 per inmate per year).
82. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 54-55.
83. Admittedly, the concerns of defense attorneys pale in comparison to those of a pretrial
detainee. Yet the inability of a defense attorney to reach their client also harms the client. After
all, the repercussions that a defense attorney might face would only come to fruition in the
event of the client's conviction.
84. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 56 ("Members of the defense bar observed that the usual
problems of preparing criminal cases for detainees were exacerbated in those jurisdictions
where their clients were held in custody at a distance from the court. They further stated that the
delays in their preparation time often impacted negatively on the ability of the courts to arrange
their calendars."). If the defendant is represented by the public defender's office, the chance of
being detained in a remote location increases. See Interview with Dan Cronin, supra note 46.
85. See supra note 72.
86. See Broderick, supra note 70, at 6 ("[A]ttomeys cannot contact [clients] because they
do not know where they are.... Mail contact is difficult: the defendants have often been moved
by the time mail reaches a location which has been identified.... When defendants are moved
their court clothes and legal papers are often left behind.").
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may restrict their communication. 87
D. Effect on the Federal Court System
Pretrial detention also has a straining effect on the federal court
system. The pretrial detention system demands the time and effort of
prosecutors, judges, marshals, probation officers, public defenders,
and pretrial services officers. This need for additional resources
magnifies the problems generated by underfunding.
Consequently, pretrial detention causes an already slow judicial
process to function even slower. The movement of pretrial detainees
from one facility to another often forces a federal court to alter its
calendar." Such delays only reinforce the lack of confidence many
people have in the criminal justice system.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The proposed solutions to the pretrial detention crisis suggested
by other commentators only address specific aspects of the criminal
justice system. Some proposals focus on redefining the BRA in order
to reduce judicial discretion when making a detention
determination. 9  Another commentator contends that the
87. See id. at 7 ("Defense attorneys often find it difficult or impracticable to travel to
detention facilities, to connect with shuttled clients, or to meet confidently with clients in
detention facilities without fear of eavesdropping.").
88. See id. ("When lockdowns or headcounts occur in detention facilities courts must
without advance notice readjust their often-crowded calendars."). See also BAK, supra note 62,
pt. II (conceding pretrial detention sometimes leads to delays in the court calendar due to the
difficulty of moving defendants from jail to court).
89. See infra Part W.A. This faction of thought asserts the advantages of making pretrial
detention determinations strictly by the percentages would outweigh the injustice to the few and
correct the inherent flaws in the system. This Note, however, does not explore such a concept
because it would require repealing much of section 3142. Such an approach would save the
costs and delays of pretrial service officers. It would also satisfy those critics who feel a judicial
officer is given too much discretion when making a pretrial detention determination. Further,
prosecutors would no longer be able to misuse their authority to seek pretrial detention.
Such a solution, however, presents a serious departure from the historical conventions of
the judicial system. Clearly, it demonstrates a lack of faith in the judicial system and,
specifically, it reflects a lack of confidence in the conventional wisdom of judges. Further, the
unequivocal randomness of such a system may produce a situation where an innocent person is
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improvement" of pretrial services is the solution.9 ' The history of bail
reform,92 however, suggests that in order to be successful a solution
must work within the confines of the statute to improve all areas of
the criminal justice system that effect a detention determination.
A. Redefine the Statute
Critics of the BRA maintain that section 3142 allows judges and
prosecuting attorneys too much discretion at detention hearings.93 As
a result, these critics have suggested a variety of specific changes to
the BRA, all designed to decrease the discretion of judges and
prosecutors. 4 For example, one commentator criticizes section 3142
for not limiting a prosecuting attorney or judge's ability to seek
pretrial detention.95 The commentator maintains that although section
3142 specifically lists the circumstances under which a detention
hearing can be initiated,96 the language of the statute fails to restrict
its application because of the addition of a "crime of violence" to the
list of triggering offenses.97 Although a definition of "crime of
violence" is provided in section 3156(a)(4),98 the definition is fairly
incarcerated, simply because he or she falls in a statistical category. In general, such a solution
embraces an attitude which inherently contradicts the theory that you are innocent until proven
guilty and violates the Eighth Amendment restriction on cruel and unusual punishment.
90. In some instances, however, the establishment of pretrial services is the answer. See
supra Part II.A.
91. See Wanger, supra note 35 (arguing that the statutory mandate of pretrial services
should be fulfilled).
92. Congress codified the change in bail law in 1966 and replaced it in 1984 with the
current act.
93. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 62, at 389-90; John S. Goldkamp, Judicial
Responsibility for Pretrial Release Decisionmaldng and the Information Role of Pretrial
Services, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1993, at 29.
94. See Williams, supra note 62, at 378-88.
95. See id. Although the article concedes that the statute attempts to avoid such abuse, the
author seeks a practical limit to the application of pretrial detention. See id.
96. See supra note 17. See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751 ("We think that
Congress' careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention will be permitted
satisfies [the defendant's interest in liberty].").
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f(1)(A) (1994). Such a catch-all provision encompasses a wide
range of offenses and its definition may vary from courthouse to courthouse.
98. The term "crime of violence" means-
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broad and open to various interpretations.
One commentator suggests that the BRA should limit the length
of time a pretrial detainee can spend in jail before his case is tried.99
The commentator argues that a statutory maximum on the time spent
in pretrial detainment would at least curtail the harm to the
defendant."°
Another commentator recommends increasing the standard of
proof required for the dangerous determination to one of "clear and
convincing evidence."''1 Section 3142 of the BRA does not address
the degree to which the judge must be persuaded that the defendant is
dangerous. 02 Consequently, a low evidentiary standard is the only
check on judicial discretion. 3 Accordingly, an increase in the burden
of proof would limit the role a judge's discretion plays in a detention
(A) an offense that has as an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another,
(B) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense; or
(C) any felony under chapter 109A or chapter 110.
18 U.S.C. § 3156(aX4).
99. See Kevin F. Arthur, Comment, Preventive Detention: Liberty in the Balance, 46 MD.
L, REv. 378, 386-87 (1987). The District of Columbia pretrial detention model does include an
express time limit of 120 days. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(h) (1994).
100. See Arthur, supra note 99, at 386. The author explains that the Act contains
"loopholes" that prolong pretrial detention:
Congress intended that the Speedy Trial Act would limit the length of pretrial
detention. Section 3164 of the Speedy Trial Act states that pretrial detainees must
come to trial within ninety days after detention begins. Unfortunately, the "days" to
which that section refers are not calendar days. Section 3161(h) contains numerous
provisions for "excludable time" that does not count against the ninety-day
requirement.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
101. See Robert S. Natalini, Comment, Preventive Detention and Presuming
Dangerousness Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 225,234 (1985).
102. In contrast, the statute explicitly states that a judge must be persuaded by a clear and
convincing standard that the facts asserted to show dangerousness are true. See 18 U.S.C. §
3142(0 ("The facts the [judge] uses to support a finding ... that no conditions or combination
of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community shall be
supported by clear and convincing evidence.").
103. See Natalini, supra note 101, at 234-35 (asserting that because the prosecution has the
burden of persuasion, the standard of proof must be a "preponderance of the evidence").
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determination."°4
History suggests, however, that statutory revision of the BRA is
unlikely to be effective. Twice before, in 1966 and again in 1984,
Congress made extensive revisions to the standard use of bail to
remedy its then-existing deficiencies. °5 Despite Congress' efforts, the
revisions did not lead to an effective pretrial detention system.
Indeed, minor statutory revisions, such as those suggested above,
will not individually alleviate the pretrial detention "crisis." The
pretrial detention system is in such a state of disarray that wide
spread changes, not piece-meal modifications, are necessary.
Furthermore, because the success of the pretrial detention system
under section 3142 depends upon ajudge's ability to make a case-by-
case detention determination, limiting the role of judicial discretion at
detention hearings may cause the system to self-destruct.
B. Improve Pretrial Services
The importance of the Pretrial Services Act of 1982 (PSA) 1 6 to
the successful implementation of the BRA is recognized throughout
the legal community.'0 7 Pretrial services offices (PTSO) are
responsible for making detention recommendations to the judges
conducting detention hearings. 8
Advocates of an improved PTSO point to the effectiveness of
pretrial detention in districts which have a fully implemented
104. Otherwise, the grand jury stands as the last check on judicial discretion because most
courts have held that an indictment (from the grand jury) satisfies the probable cause
requirement embodied in the Act. See Williams, supra note 63, at 381.
105. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text; Pringle, supra note 2, at 913.
106. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3156. In short, "[t]he pretrial services mission is to 'staff' the
judicial pretrial release function and to provide the wherewithal to manage the fair and effective
use of pretrial release and detention." Goldkamp, supra note 93, at 32.
107. See Goldkamp, supra note 93, at 29 ("A large part of the emphasis of 'bail reform'
was on developing pretrial services-type agencies to improve judges' decisions."). See also Joel
B. Rosen, Pretrial Services-A Magistrate Judge's Perspective, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1993,
at 15 (urging fellow judges to make use of pretrial services when faced with detention
decisions). But see Wanger, supra note 35 (discussing how the Pretrial Services Act was created
to facilitate the successful implementation of the BRA, yet has failed to do so).
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 3154.
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PTSO.'" In those districts, detention hearings are held promptly and
judges are fully informed on available alternatives to detention."' As
a result, the negative impact of incarceration can be avoided."' Such
advocates implore the implementation of a separate and fully
operational PTSO."' However, an unrealistic over-tone hampers this
scheme because it requires increased spending."' Consequently, the
improved model of PTSO such commentators seek is not practical.
Apart from the practicality issue, the improved PTSO solution,
exclusively, will fail to solve the pretrial detention crisis. Pretrial
services officers are not the only officers who affect a detention
determination. By failing to provide for all the negative factors of
pretrial detention, a piece-meal approach will inevitably fail.
V. THE SOLUTION
Although Congress entrusted detention determinations to
judges," 4 they cannot successfully fulfill such a complex duty
without the assistance of the entire criminal justice system. The tools
Congress wanted judges to rely upon to make detention
determinations include the following officers of the court: marshals,
United States prosecuting attorneys, probation officers, pretrial
services officers, and public defenders. Therefore, the burden of
109. Districts that have successfully implemented such a program demonstrate that such a
tool would not only improve the application of pretrial detention but also expedite the process.
The acceleration of detention hearings would afford defendants a shorter wait in jail for a
detention hearing. See Shelby Meyer & Kim M. Holloway, The Fastrack Program, FED.
PROBATION, Mar. 1993, at 36.
110. See id.
I Il. A revamped PTSO does not necessarily result in fewer pretrial detainees. The judge
still has the ultimate discretion to order detention. But an improved PTSO will help the judge
make more accurate dangerousness determinations, thus avoiding detainment of non-dangerous
defendants.
112. See. e.g., Wanger, supra note 35, at 339.
113. Seeid
114. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 5 ("The constraints of the Bail Reform Act fail to grant the
courts the authority to impose conditions of release geared toward assuring community safety,
or the authority to deny release to those defendants who pose an especially grave risk to the
safety of the community. If a court believes that a defendant poses such a danger, it faces a
dilemma-either it can release the defendant prior to trial despite these fears, or it can find a
reason, such as risk of flight, to detain the defendant (usually by imposing high money bond).").
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justly utilizing pretrial detention falls upon several components of the
criminal justice system; not one level of the administration.
First, the United States Marshals Office (USMO) must understand
its impact on a detention determination. The USMO is responsible for
transporting prisoners to and from the courthouse."5 Significantly,
the USMO has set a policy guideline of housing a secured defendant
within a thirty minute drive from the courthouse."6 Such a restriction
places a practical limit on which probationary alternatives are
available to a judge. The USMO must be more lenient in some
circumstances. Such a policy change" 7 would make particular
probationary alternatives, such as halfWay houses, available as
alternatives to detention.
Likewise, the United States Prosecutor's Office (USPO) should
reconsider its role in a detention hearing. By not using pretrial
detention as a bargaining chip during plea negotiations, prosecutors
would eliminate much of the criticism surrounding pretrial detention.
Furthermore, pretrial detention would be utilized only in those
circumstances truly warranting it, thus limiting the possibility of an
115. U.S. MARSHALS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE
PAST AND PRESENT (1992).
Confining prisoners in custody and safely transporting them to and from detention
facilities to judicial proceedings is [a] historic function of the Marshals Service....
Annually, the Marshals Service receives more than 88,000 individuals charged with
crimes. On the average, each prisoner was produced five time for appearances at
detention hearings, trials, other court proceedings, for medical care, or transfers
between detention facilities. The average number of prisoners in Marshals Service
custody each day now stands at more than 15,000.
Id.
116. See supra note 54. The USMO applies the 30 minute drive standard loosely when
determining where to incarcerate a defendant. As a result, defendants may end up being housed
further away than the maximum 30 minute drive. Although this places strain upon a public
defender, a public defender is sometimes willing to bear the burden if the defendant will be
safer in a detention facility farther away. Public defenders would similarly overlook the
inconvenience of contacting a defendant a far distance away in order to secure a probationary
alternative for a defendant, such as a halfway house. However, the USMO adheres to the thirty
minute drive standard more strictly with respect to alternatives to detention. See Interview with
Dan Cronin, supra note 45.
117. The United States Marshals Service is an autonomous government agency whose
director can determine agency policy. See 28 U.S.C. § 561 (1994).
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inaccurate detention determination. Generally, the USPO must
approach pretrial detention as a method of removing dangerous
criminals from the street, not as an opportunity to extract guilty pleas
or cooperation from accused criminals." 8
One alternative is for the USPO to adopt an objective approach to
seeking pretrial detention. A rating system like the one utilized by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons in evaluating dangerous inmates provides a
good example." 9 The Bureau of Prisons uses a point system when
determining the security level of the facility in which an inmate
should be detained. 2  The USPO could adopt a similar objective
approach. Such a system might consist of defendants compiling
points for incidents of dangerous behavior.'2' The USPO would then
seek detention only after a defendant attained a certain point level.
This way detention decisions are truly based on dangerousness, rather
than on a defendant's willingness to cooperate with the
government.
22
Next, the enhancement of pretrial services is paramount to the
successful renovation of the pretrial detention system." Numerous
studies and law review articles attest to the importance of pretrial
services. 24 Thus, a separate, well-funded, well-organized pretrial
services office (PTSO) is ideal. Unfortunately, a lack of funding for
118. See supra Part II.C and accompanying notes.
119. See generally Alan Ellis, Securing a Favorable Federal Prison for Your Client, 11
CRIM. JUST. 36 (1996).
120. See id.
121. For example, a defendant might acquire one point for a prior felony conviction and
two points for avoiding arrest or for violating parole.
122. Another alternative is a system that holds prosecutors accountable for their decisions.
A system which requires prosecutors to obtain approval from a supervisor before seeking
pretrial detention may accomplish this goal. This managerial system would report to a
congressional subcommittee which would ensure the non-abusive use of pretrial detention by
either enacting legislation or making personnel changes. Such a system would have to be tiered
to account for the immediate nature of detention determinations. Therefore, district supervisors
and regional supervisors will have to be employed. These supervisors should be hired from
outside the prosecutors office to promote non-bias and impartiality.
123. See Wanger, supra note 35, at 339 ("Lawyers, judges and lawmakers should
reexamine the importance of pretrial services to just administration of the federal bail
process.").
124. See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
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the PTSO has led to its current inadequate state. 25 Even though the
costs which accompany a separate PTSO may be justifiable when
considering the cost-effective nature of probation alternatives, a
separate PTSO may be an unrealistic goal.
Fortunately, alternatives to a separate, well-funded PTSO exist.
For example, a single pretrial services officer could work out of the
probation office,' 26 focusing primarily on updating and presenting
pretrial services reports. If one pretrial services officer is insufficient
to handle the caseload, that officer could act as the pretrial services
coordinator and delegate pretrial services duties to probation officers
and oversee their work.'27 Regardless of which alternative is utilized,
the performance of a pretrial services officer is critical to the effective
use of pretrial detention.
Another modification that would improve the pretrial detention
system is increasing the availability of alternatives to detention. 28 As
this Note explains, several alternatives to detention are recommended
by the judiciary but are not always available. 129 The unavailability of
such alternatives is puzzling, considering that they are cost-
effective. 30
Increasing detention alternatives could be accomplished by either
an increase in funding or a reallocation of funds. If the state is
incapable of providing the necessary funding, there are at least two
possible methods of holding defendants financially responsible for
detention alternatives. First, the federal government could initially
125. See Wanger, supra note 35, at 330.
126. See Interview with Dan Cronin, supra note 46. Such a scenario exists in the Southern
District of Illinois. The probationary officer fills the role of probation officer as well as pretrial
services officer. See id. However, it is difficult to distinguish the two roles. Different
approaches are required when, on the one hand, dealing with a defendant who has not yet been
convicted, and, on the other hand, assisting a defendant who has been convicted. See id.
127. See D. Alan Henry, Pretrial Programs: Describing the Ideal, FED. PROBATION, Mar.
1993, at 23. Henry also maintains a pretrial services officer's work is only half done after a
detention hearing because he or she must monitor a defendant's probation. See id. at 25. If a
judge is confident that pretrial conditions will be monitored, the judge may be more willing to
consider the various alternatives to detention.
128. See supra Part II.B.
129. See supra Part ll.B.
130. See Interview with Dan Cronin, supra note 45.
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subsidize the development of alternatives, and eventually shift the
cost of such detention alternatives on the defendants who are released
on probation. 3' Alternatively, a judge could condition probation on
the defendant maintaining employment.'32 The judge could then
require the defendant to pay a certain portion of his paycheck to fund
the probationary alternative. In addition, an improved pretrial
services office would be able to monitor this process.
Furthermore, the public defenders office (PDO) can also help
improve the pretrial detention system by becoming more aware of the
available probationary alternatives and by impressing an informal
influence on the PTSO. The PDO can also spend more time
examining the evidence.'33 By examining the evidence thoroughly
before a detention hearing, the PDO can possibly offer the judge
additional reasons to release the defendant on bail. However, the
statutory requirement of an immediate detention hearing'34 does not
allow a public defender much time to sift through the evidence.
Consequently, the PDO might have to utilize the five day
continuance in order to obtain more time.'35
Finally, judges must lead this necessary reform. Judges are the
only officers of the court that have the power, influence, and respect
to successfully initiate such changes. Accordingly, judges must take
an aggressive, prominent role in the reformation of pretrial detention
under section 3142 of the BRA. They should be more willing to order
131, The difficulty with such an approach is that criminal defendants often cannot afford to
pay for these alternatives. Consequently, wealth may become a determinative factor in the
pretrial detention determination. See id.
Another drawback to this scheme is that it creates the potential for a scenario in which
defendants who are not convicted must nevertheless pay for probationary alternatives. See id.
132, Cf 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(BXii).
133. The weight of the evidence against the defendant is one of the factors the judge
considers when making a detention determination. See § 3142(g)(2). Accordingly, if the public
defender can make a stronger case for the defendant's innocence, the judge is less likely to
order detention.
134. See § 3142(f).
135. See id. Comparatively, a continuance on motion of the attorney for the Government
may not exceed three days. See id. Although the public defender would have the statutory
ability to move for such a continuance, a pretrial detainee may not agree. After all, the detainee
will be in custody for the duration of the continuance. See id.
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creative alternatives to pretrial detention. Furthermore, judges must
informally influence the various officers of the court to accept and
fulfill the task of improving the system.
CONCLUSION
The shortcomings and abuses of the pretrial detention system are
deeply rooted in the criminal justice system. Proposals which take a
narrow approach to the problems raised by pretrial detention are
inadequate. A successful solution requires change at the various
levels of the criminal justice system which impact a pretrial detention
determination. Only with this sort of comprehensive change, led by
the judiciary, will the pretrial detention "crisis" be cured.
Douglas J. Klein*
* J.D. 1997, Washington University.
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